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Present research proposes the application of unsupervised and supervised machine-learning techniques to characterize Android
malware families. More precisely, a novel unsupervised neural-projection method for dimensionality-reduction, namely, Beta
Hebbian Learning (BHL), is applied to visually analyze such malware. Additionally, well-known supervised Decision Trees (DTs)
are also applied for the first time in order to improve characterization of such families and compare the original features that are
identified as the most important ones.The proposed techniques are validated when facing real-life Androidmalware data bymeans
of the well-known and publicly available Malgenome dataset. Obtained results support the proposed approach, confirming the
validity of BHL and DTs to gain deep knowledge on Android malware.
1. Introduction and Previous Work
Undoubtedly, smartphones are one of the emerging tech-
nologies that have revolutionized the use of computing
systems. From the very beginning (late 1990s), more and
more smartphones are sold every year and it is expected
that the number of smartphone users passes the 2.7 billion
mark by 2019 [1]. Although there is a variety of operating
systems for such devices, Google’s Android is themost widely
used one [1] and, consequently, the number of Android users
has permanently increased. Concurrently, the number of
Android apps strongly increased in the last years but it started
to decline from 3.6 million in March, 2017 (highest value), to
2.6 million in September, 2018 [2].
From the security standpoint, one of the main problems
of smartphone apps is malware that is included in software in
general and in these apps in particular. Furthermore, “users of
mobile devices are increasingly subject to malicious activity
pushing malware apps” [3]. It is true that some effort has
been devoted by Google to remove and prevent malicious
apps from Google Play Market, but malware is still there [3].
Moreover, malware Android apps are increasing; in the third
trimester of 2018 there has been an increase of 1.7 million
detections [4].
As it can be seen, privacy and security of smartphones still
are open challenges [5] and many researchers are working
on this topic. To better fight against malware and be able
to develop an effective solution, understanding it and its
nature is required [6]. In keeping with this idea, present
paper proposes getting deeper knowledge about Android
malware for its better detection. More precisely, both super-
vised (Decision Trees) and unsupervised (Neural Projection
Method)machine-learning techniques are applied to increase
our knowledge about the main families of Android malware.
In order to validate the proposed techniques, they are applied
to the well-known Malgenome dataset [7] that is open and
real-life.
This pioneering work on collecting Android malware
found some interesting statistics [6]motivating further analy-
sis of malware: 36.7% of the collected apps leverage root-level
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exploits to fully compromise the security of the smartphone
and more than 90% of the apps tried to turn the smartphone
into a botnet controlled through network or short messages.
To improve present knowledge of Android malware
families, a novel neural-projection technique from the family
of Exploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) techniques, named
Beta Hebbian Learning (BHL) [8], is applied. Obtained
results are then compared to those from several different
Decision Trees (DTs) [9] when trying to predict the malware
family from apps features.
Each app (data sample) that was collected for the
Malgenome dataset is defined as a set of certain features
using a binary representation. Apps were grouped according
to the family they belong to, and features were recalculated
for the whole family, taking into account which features were
present in the given apps. The generated high-dimensional
space is then analysed by means of BHL in order to reveal
the inner structure of the dataset. Obtained projections are
consequently scrutinized to get further knowledge about
the app features that define the organization of the data in
different groups and subgroups. For comparison purposes,
DTs have been additionally generated on the same features
set, in order to know the features that better discriminate
between the different malware families.
A variety of problems have been addressed by artificial
neural networks in recent decades [10–14]. More precisely,
neural projection models have been previously applied to a
wide variety of security datasets, including network traffic
[15, 16], SQL code [17, 18], and HTTP traffic [19]. Similarly,
from a more general perspective, different machine learning
solutions have been proposed to differentiate between legiti-
mate and malicious apps [20–22].
Visualization techniques have been previously applied
to this problem of analyzing malware [23–29]. However,
few dimensionality-reduction techniques have been applied
to Android apps in order to detect malware; Pythagoras
tree fractal visualization is proposed in [25], being all apps
scattered, as leaves in the tree. Graphs for deciding about
malicious apps by depicting lists of malicious methods,
needless permissions, and malicious strings were proposed
in [26]. Biclustering on permission information was used to
generate visualization in [27], while behavior-related dendro-
grams are generated out of malware traces in [28]. In the
later, different pieces of information are analysed, including
nodes related to the package name of the application, the
Android components that has called the API call, and the
names of functions and methods invoked by the application.
Differentiating from previous work, in present paper, a novel
neural projection technique is applied for the first time to the
characterization of Androidmalware [8, 24, 30]. Apps are not
analysed one by one, but family-level is considered instead.
Additionally, DTs are applied for the first time in order to
improve characterization of such families.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; initially BHL
and DTs are presented and the analyzed dataset is described
in the following section. Then, the proposed experiments
are introduced and the obtained results are analyzed in
Section 3. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented
in Section 4 of the paper.
2. Materials and Methods
In present research, the EPP BHL algorithm [8] has been
applied to a dataset of malware families with the aim of
identifying the internal structure of such dataset and finding
families of malware with similar characteristics.The obtained
results have been compared with a well-known prediction
algorithm (DT) [9] to validate the BHL results regarding
the most relevant features to briefly characterize Malware
families.
2.1. Beta Hebbian Learning. The Beta Hebbian Learning
technique (BHL) [8] is an unsupervised neural network from
the family of EPP that employs the Beta distribution to update
its learning rule and fit the Probability Density Function
(PDF) of the residual with the distribution of a given dataset.
Thus, if the PDF of the residuals is known, the optimal
cost function can be determined. By using𝐵(𝛼, 𝛽) parameters
of the Beta distribution, the residual (e) can be drawnwith the
following PDF:
𝑝 (𝑒) = 𝑒𝛼−1 (1 − 𝑒)𝛽−1 = (𝑥 − 𝑊𝑦)𝛼−1 (1 − 𝑥 + 𝑊𝑦)𝛽−1 (1)
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are used to adjust the shape of the PDF of
the Beta distribution, 𝑥 is the input of the network, 𝑒 is the
residual, 𝑊 is the weight matrix, and 𝑦 is the output of the
network.
Then, by using the following, gradient descent is per-
formed to maximize the likelihood of the weights:
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑊 = (𝑒𝛼−2𝑗 (1 − 𝑒𝑗)
𝛽−2 (− (𝛼 − 1) (1 − 𝑒𝑗) + 𝑒𝑗 (𝛽 − 1)))
= (𝑒𝛼−2𝑗 (1 − 𝑒𝑗)𝛽−2 (1 − 𝛼 + 𝑒𝑗 (𝛼 + 𝛽 − 2)))
(2)
In the case of BHL, the learning rule allows for fitting the
PDF of the residual, by maximizing the likelihood of such
residual with the current distribution.
Therefore, the neural architecture for BHL is defined as
follows:
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 : 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑁∑
𝑗=1
𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗, ∀𝑖 (3)




= 𝜂 (𝑒𝛼−2𝑗 (1 − 𝑒𝑗)𝛽−2 (1 − 𝛼 + 𝑒𝑗 (𝛼 + 𝛽 − 2))) 𝑦𝑖 (5)
2.2. Decision Trees. Decision Trees (DTs) [9] are machine-
learning algorithms widely used for prediction that have
proved their benefits in several real applications. They can be
categorized as supervised nonparametric inductive learning
techniques. They are based on the construction of diagrams












Figure 1: Structure of decision trees.
on rules, which serve to represent and categorize a series of
conditions that occur repeatedly for the solution of a problem.
The main objective of a classification DT is to divide
a dataset into groups of samples as similar as possible in
relation to one of the features. They are made of three main
elements: root node (contains all samples of the dataset),
decision nodes (represent a decision or rule), and leaf nodes
(final label). A dataset is then classified based on subdivisions
of the DT nodes to reach one of the final (leaf) nodes whose
label corresponds to a class (Figure 1).
Several algorithms have been proposed so far to build
DTs and their efficiency has been proved. The most notable
ones [31] are ID3 (Iterative Dichotomiser 3), C4.5 (successor
of ID3), CART (Classification and Regression Tree), CHAID
(CHi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector), MARS, and
Conditional Inference Trees. Among all of them, CART has
been selected in present work due to two main reasons: the
binary nature of the dataset and the main objective of the
study (to identify the most relevant features of the dataset)
[31].
2.2.1. CART. TheClassification and Regression Tree (CART)
[9] is a binary tree, so each decision node has two binary
branches determined by a splinting function obtained by
processing variance function. In order to build the tree, this
CART algorithm takes 4 main steps [9]:
(1) Build the decision tree splitting nodes according to a
given function.
(2) Finish tree construction once the learning fits the stop
criteria.
(3) Pruning the tree to avoid overfitting.
(4) Select the best tree after pruning process.
Originally, the splitting function used by CART is the
Gini Index
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 (𝑆) = 1 − 𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑝2𝑖 (6)
where 𝑆 is the dataset, 𝑛 is the number of classes in the
dataset, and p is the probability of different classes.Therefore,
a Gini index of 0 means a 100% accuracy in predicting the
class.
For comparison purposes, two other splitting functions
have been applied in present paper: Deviance (7) and Twoing
(8)
𝐷𝑒V𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑆) = − 𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖 log2 𝑝𝑖 (7)
Twoing is a splitting function different from Gini and
Deviance. Being 𝐿 𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖 there is fraction of members
of class 𝑖 in the left and right child nodes after a split,
respectively. 𝑃𝐿 and 𝑃𝑅 are the fractions of observations that
split to the left and right, respectively.Therefore, the function
to be maximized is the one in
𝑃𝐿𝑃𝑅( 𝑛∑
𝑖=1
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝐿 𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨)
2
(8)
On the other hand, in standard CART algorithm, the
split feature that is selected for a decision node is the one
that maximizes the split-criterion gain. Once again, for a
more comprehensive comparison, two other criteria have
been applied for selecting split features: curvature [32] and
interaction [33]. These criteria can be defined as follows:
(i) Curvature: it is based on the null hypothesis of unas-
sociated two features. With these criteria, the best
split predictor feature is the one that minimizes the
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significant p-values of curvature tests between each
feature and the response variable. Such a selection is
robust to the number of levels in individual features.
(ii) Interaction: it is based on the null hypothesis of
no interaction between the label and the predictor
features. Therefore, for deep decision trees, standard
CART tends to miss important interactions between
pairs of features when there are also many other less
important features. By means of this criterion, the
detection of such important interactions is improved.
2.3. Malgenome Dataset. The dataset used in this research
has been obtained from the Android Malware Genome
Project [7], which consists on 1260 Androidmalware samples
grouped in a total of 49 malware families. It was collected
from August 2010 to October 2011 and still is a standard
benchmark dataset for Android Malware.
This dataset contains malware apps installed in user
phones and based on 3 main attack strategies: repackaging,
update attack, and drive-by download. Samples of this dataset
were manually classified based on different aspects such
as installation and activation mechanisms and malicious
payloads nature. Collected malware was split in families that
were obtained “by carefully examining the related security
announcements, threat reports, and blog contents from
existing mobile antivirus companies and active researchers
as exhaustively as possible and diligently requesting malware
samples from them or actively crawling from existing official
and alternative Android Markets” [6].
The different families present in the dataset are
ADRD, AnserverBot, Asroot, BaseBridge, BeanBot,




Endofday, FakeNetflix, FakePlayer, GamblerSMS,
Geinimi, GGTracker, GingerMaster, GoldDream, Gone60,
GPSSMSSpy, HippoSMS, Jifake, jSMSHider, Kmin, Lovetrap,
NickyBot, Nickyspy, Pjapps, Plankton, RogueLemon,
RogueSPPush, SMSReplicator, SndApps, Spitmo, TapSnake,
Walkinwat, YZHC, zHash, Zitmo, and Zsone.
Therefore, the final dataset is made of a total of 49
samples, one for each family of malware, defined by a total of
26 binary features divided in 6 categories (Table 1). A detailed
description of each feature can be found in the original paper
[6], and some previous work where this dataset is used can be
found in [34–36].
3. Experiments and Results
This section presents the experiments performed and the
results obtained in the validation process of the proposed
solution.
Both BHL (Section 2.1) and DT (Section 2.2) algorithms
have been applied to the previously described dataset (Sec-
tion 2.3), in order to identify the features that define the
internal structure of the data and that support the grouping
of the different families of malware attacks. In the conducted









Figure 2: BHL: Projection of malware families.
experiments, firstly BHL is applied to identify groups of
malware families with similar behaviour. This is done by
visually inspecting the obtained BHL projections, and the
most relevant features are consequently identified. Then, the
dataset is analyzed by means of DTs to determine the level of
importance of each feature, considering as the most relevant
features those that are used in the decision nodes at lowest
depth.
In Figure 2 it is shown the best projection obtained by
BHL using the following parameter values: 𝛼 = 3, 𝛽 = 4,𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 1000, and 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 0.05. These
parameter values were chosen in an experimental process
of trial and error. As parameter tuning is a task that is
very dependent on the dataset to be used, several initial
experiments were conducted with a range of combinations of
these parameter values.
Based on such projection, samples are grouped in 2
main clusters: G1 and G2 (Figure 3). Additionally, several
subgroups (at a 3 level depth, i.e., G1 󳨀→ G1A 󳨀→ G1A.1,
G1A.2, G1A.3, and G1A.4) can be defined in these main
groups.
Figure 4 presents the split of family groups in a schema
that shows the results of thoroughly analyzing the allocation
of families in groups. The most relevant features that have
been identified, varying from one cluster to another, can be
seen. As an example, data are split in G1 and G2 based on the
features “Repackaging” and “Standalone.” The complete lists
of families assigned to each one of the groups are presented
in Figures 5 and 6. Malware families are allocated in the same
group as they are associated to similar characteristics and
behaviour, and therefore there could be similar ways to deal
with them.
Based on the analysis of BHL results, the most relevant
features, in decreasing order of importance, are “Repackag-
ing” and “Standalone,” “Boot” and “Activation: SMS,” and
“Financial Charges: SMS.”
BHL clearly outperforms other algorithms used in pre-
vious works [24, 29], providing a clearer visualization
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Table 1: Features in the Malgenome Dataset.
Category 1: Installation 1.Repackaging, 2.Update, 3.Drive-by download, 4.Standalone
Category 2: Activation 5.Boot, 6.SMS, 7.Net, 8.Call, 9.USB, 10.PKG, 11.Batt, 12.SYS, 13.Main
Category 3: Privilege escalation 14.exploid, 15.RATC/zimperlich, 16.ginger break, 17.asroot, 18.encrypted
Category 4: Remote control 19.NET, 20.SMS
Category 5: Financial charges 21.phone call, 22.SMS, 23.block SMS
Category 6: Personal information stealing 24.SMS, 25.phone number, 26.user account
Table 2: Summary table of DT results: minimum depth of decision nodes for each one of the original features.
Deviance Gini Twoing





1 Repackaging 1 2 4 1 2 6 1 2 4 2.56
5 BOOT 2 3 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 2.78
18 Encrypted 4 2 4 4 2 3.20
9 USB 6 3 5 3 4 6 3 4.29
3 Drive-byDownload 5 5 4 2 5 6 5 5 4 4.56
24 SMS 4 3 5 10 3 6 3 3 5 4.67
26 User Account 6 1 8 3 1 8 6 1 8 4.67
2 Update 5 7 4 2 6 3 5 7 4 4.78
19 NET 6 2 8 9 2 3 4 2 8 4.89
6 SMS 3 6 5 8 7 3 3 6 4 5.00
10 PKG 6 5 4 5 4 6 5 5.00
22 SMS 3 6 4 10 6 4 3 6 4 5.11
4 Standalone 5 10 3 3 9 3 5 10 3 5.67
8 CALL 4 7 4 8 4 7 5.67
11 BATT 4 9 5 4 5 4 9 5.71
16 Ginger Break 6 6.00
15 RATC/Zimperlich 6 8 1 9 9 8 7 8 1 6.33
7 NET 5 8 6 10 9 2 5 8 6 6.56
14 Exploid 5 8 6 9 6 6 5 8 6 6.56
17 Asroot 7 4 7 11 4 9 8 4 7 6.78
23 Block SMS 3 8 5 9 9 9 4 8 6 6.78
25 Phone Number 2 11 2 12 12 11 2 11 2 7.22
12 SYS 5 10 6 10 11 7 5 10 6 7.78
21 Phone Call 4 9 12 13 7 4 9 5 7.88
13 MAIN 6 11 7 10 12 1 6 11 7 7.89
20 SMS 10 8 9.00
of the internal structure of the dataset. Groups obtained
by BHL are more compact and well defined than the
groups generated by other EPP techniques in the previous
work.
In addition to the BHL experiments, experiments with
DTs were additionally conducted in order to compare and
validate the obtained results. As it has been previously
mentioned, 3 different splitting functions have been applied
in present paper: Gini, Deviance, and Twoing. In addition, 3
different criteria for selecting split features have been applied:
Standard, Curvature, and Interaction.
As an example, one of the obtained DTs is shown in
Figure 7. This is the tree generated from the Malgenome
dataset when applying the standard CART split criteria and
theDeviance function. It has been selected as it is the onewith
lowest depth. In the leaf nodes, labels refer to family numbers
(alphabetically ordered as presented in Section 2.3).
To show the most interesting results from the different
alternatives to build DT, information has been summarized
in Table 2. For each combination of splitting function and
selecting criteria, the minimum depth of decision nodes
linked to each one of the original features is shown. That is,
6 Complexity





























































































































Figure 4: Schematic clustering and relevant features from BHL projection.
when the same feature appears in more than one node, the
minimum depth of all these nodes is the one selected for the
given feature. In the case a certain feature was not included in
the DT, there is no value.
In this table it can be seen that results (slightly or
significantly) vary when comparing the obtained results (by
different splitting function and selecting criteria) for a certain
feature. As general conclusions cannot be derived and to sum
up all figures, the average depth value is calculated for each
feature, that is, further analyzed.
When analyzing Figure 4 and Table 2, it can be seen
that results from BHL and DT are coherent. In the case of
BHL, it can be seen that Repackaging is identified as the
most discriminative feature, because the two main groups
in the dataset (G1 and G2) take complementary values for















































































































































































































































Figure 6: Families allocation in Group 2 and relevant features identified in BHL projection.
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Figure 7: DT obtained with standard CART split criteria and Deviance function.
lowest mean depth, being included in all the generated trees.
Furthermore, it was selected for the root node of 3DTs.When
analyzing subgroups in BHL projection (Figure 3), it can be
seen that BOOT is the feature that drive the split in 1st-level
subgroups (subgroups G1A and G1B in the case of group
G1, and subgroups G2A and G2B in the case of group G2).
In keeping with this idea, according to DTs results, Boot is
the second feature with the lowest mean depth. For the next
level of importance, the BHL projection identifies Financial
Charges SMS and Activation SMS as the features that best
explain the split in different subgroups. The two of them are
also selected by DTs as ranked in the first half of features with
a lowestmean depth, although some other features take lower
values.
Additionally, from the DTs results (Table 2), Privilege
escalation-Ginger Break and Remote control-SMS can be
identified as the least relevant features. The former was not
included in 7 (out of 9) DTs while the latter was not included
in 6. Furthermore, Remote control-SMS is the feature with
a highest value of the average depth, taking a value of
9. It means that these features are almost useless when
characterizing malware families.
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Results from present paper are consistent with those
obtained in previous work [30] when applying Feature
Selection (FS) to the same dataset. Installation-Repackaging,
Activation-SMS, Activation-Boot, Remote Control-NET, and
Financial Charges-SMS were identified as the 5 most rel-
evant features in order to characterize malware families,
according to a given method of filter-based FS: Minimum-
Redundancy Maximum Relevance. This method is intended
at obtaining the maximum relevance to the output while
keeping redundancy of selected features to lowest levels.
Complementarily, two evolutionary approaches to FS (GA-
ICC-W and GA-I-W) identified Installation-Repackaging,
Installation-Standalone, Activation-SMS, Remote Control-
NET, and Financial Charges-SMS as the 5most relevant ones.
These methods perform the selection of features according
to the Information Correlation Coefficient and the Mutual
Information, respectively.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, some machine learning techniques have been
applied to Android malware data in order to analyse the
features of such apps and subsequently identify the ones that
better define the organization ofmalware families. As a result,
detection and categorization of malware could be improved
and spedup at the same time. Furthermore, by knowing about
these features, malware apps could be identifiedmore quickly
and precisely and then removed from the official Android
market.
From the obtained results some conclusions can be
derived; first of all, the proposed machine-learning tech-
niques probed to successfully address the given challenge.
BHL has outperformed previous neural projection tech-
niques that have been applied to the same data in clearly
revealing the structure of the Malgenome dataset. Addition-
ally, features identified as the most important ones by such
EPP technique are also highlighted by DTs as being relevant
to better differentiate between malware families.
Obtained results are consistent with those obtained by
FS and hence validate present proposal. Future work will
focus on the development of a Hybrid Intelligent System
to integrate results from the previously validated machine-
learning techniques. In addition, it will be applied to up-to-
datemalware datasets in order to check its performancewhen
facing 0-day malware.
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Rieck, “Drebin: effective and explainable detection of android
malware in your pocket,” in Proceedings of the 2014 Network and
Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium, vol. 14, pp. 23–
26, 2014.
[36] G. Suarez-Tangil, S. K. Dash,M. Ahmadi, J. Kinder, G. Giacinto,
and L. Cavallaro, “Droidsieve: Fast and accurate classification
of obfuscated android malware,” in Proceedings of the Seventh
ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and



















































































Submit your manuscripts at
www.hindawi.com
